摘要
研究了由一个制造商和一个线上零售商组成的供应链定价与促销问题。考虑消费者在线上购买产品时可能存在的退货行为,构建了存在企业社会责任的供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了企业社会责任对供应链均衡、供应链成员利润以及消费者剩余的影响。结果表明,当线上零售商退货损失及其承担的社会责任比例满足一定条件时,线上零售商会实施低价策略和提高其促销努力水平;供应链成员的社会责任并不一定能有效地增加产品需求和提高消费者剩余;企业社会责任能够有效提升供应链成员的总效用,但不一定能够提升二者的纯利润。
This paper analyzes the optimal pricing and promotion strategies within a supply chain that consists of a manufacturers and an online retailer. It builds a Stackelberg game model for a socially responsible online supply chain with consumer returns. Further,the impact of corporate socially responsible on the equilibriums,the profit of the manufacturers and the online retailer,consumer surplus are analyzed. Results show that,the corporate socially responsible leads to lower retail price and higher promotional effort when the socially responsible online retailer's concerned and the online retailer's return cost meets certain conditions. The corporate socially responsible leads to the change of the demands and the consumer surplus. In conclusion,the corporate socially responsible can increase the supply chain members' total utility,but not necessarily in favor of the supply chain members' pure profits.
作者
金亮
郝冠淞
JIN Liang;HAO Guan-song(School of Economics and Management,Nanchang University,Nanchang 330031;Sino -italy Ningbo Ecological Park Administrative Committee,Ningbo 315000)
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第8期106-111,共6页
Soft Science
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(17CJL017)
关键词
企业社会责任
线上零售
消费者退货
促销
corporate social responsibility
online retail
consumer returns
promotion strategies