认知渗透与新独断论

Cognitive Penetration and New Dogmatism

认知渗透指的是这样一种现象,认知状态有时会反过来影响知觉经验。认知渗透似乎对知觉辩护构成了威胁。西格尔以独断论为例,说明了认知渗透是如何给知觉辩护带来问题的。她的结论是,独断论无法应对来自认知渗透的挑战。本文表明,独断论之所以会面临认知渗透的问题,是因为它被理解为承诺了认识论的现象主义,即知觉经验可单凭它的现象特征提供辩护。但新独断论抛弃认识论的现象主义,因而不会有认知渗透的问题。相反,认知渗透恰好表明,新独断论是适切的。

Cognitive penetration is the phenomenon that cognition sometimes exerts top-down effects on perception. It seems that cognitive penetration poses a threat to perceptual justification. Taking dogmatism as a paradigm, Susanna Siegel has argued that the threat cognitive penetration posed to perceptual justification is intractable. This paper shows that the reason why dogmatism is taken to be unable to give an adequate account of cognitive penetration is that it was thought to be epistemological phenomenalism. But if we reject epistemological phenomenalism and come to endorse a new version, that is, new dogmatism, then the threat pose by cognitive penetration dissolves. The conclusion, hence, is that cognitive penetration is not a threat to new dogmatism. On the contrary, it shows that new dogmatism is adequate.