薪酬激励、股权激励与上市公司业绩——基于我国沪深上市公司数据的实证研究

Incentive Mechanism, Stock Ownership Incentive and Listed Company Performance——Based on the Data about Listed Companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen

文章以我国2016年沪深两市3529家上市公司为研究样本,在控制上市公司规模、行业类别和实际控制人经济性质等变量的前提下,研究管理层薪酬激励、股权激励与上市公司业绩之间的关系。研究发现:第一,薪酬激励和股权激励对我国上市公司业绩有显著影响,但解释程度较低,管理层平均薪酬和限制性股票激励方式与公司资产收益率有显著正相关关系;第二,管理层持股比例与公司资产收益率存在显著正相关关系。可见,我国上市公司管理层激励还没有发挥应有的作用,在薪酬激励方面,不仅要提高管理层团队的薪酬水平,还要缩小管理层内部的薪酬差距;在股权激励方面,应重点选择限制性股票激励方式,既要发挥长期激励效果,又要有助于提升管理层持股比例。

There are 3529 listed companies selected from Shanghai and Shenzhen as researching samples in 2016. On the premise of variables, including controlling the size of listed companies, industry categories and actual controllers of the economic nature, the relations among payments incentive for management layers, stock rights incentive and the performances of the listed companies are studied. The research shows two phenomenons. Firstly, payments incentives and stock rights incentives contain significant impacts on the performances of listed companies in China, but the degree of interpretation is relatively low. There is a significantly positive-correlation relation between the rates of return on assets of the company and average payments for management layers with incentive method of restricted stock. Secondly, there is a significantly positive-correlation relation between management shareholding and corporate assets return. So, the management incentive in listed companies has not played a role in China. In the term of payments incentive, it is not only necessary to improve payment level for management teams, but also narrow the payment gap within managers. In the term of stock rights incentive, it is necessary to focus on restricted-stock incentives, due to long-term effects and improvement of shareholding proportions for management layers.