中国混合所有制企业公司治理特殊性及治理效率的实证研究

An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance Specificity and Governance Efficiency of Chinese Mixed Ownership Enterprises

虽然公司治理模式的研究框架已经相对成熟,但中国的混合所有制企业在公司治理上存在着诸多的特殊性,而这些特殊性又会在很大程度上影响公司治理的效率。鉴于过去多是从普通的治理结构框架来探究混合所有制企业的公司治理,本文以混合所有制企业公司治理模式的特殊性出发提出研究假设,得出了不同于以往研究的结论:董事长与总经理由同一人兼任并不会显著地降低公司治理效率;"老三会"在上市企业中融入了新的公司治理机制中,起到了监督与监控的作用,因此降低了公司的违规次数;高管薪酬激励对公司治理效率的影响并没有想象中那么大。这些可以为混合所有制企业公司治理结构优化提供有益的理论参考与借鉴。

Although the research framework of corporate governance has been relatively mature, but Chinese mixed ownership enterprises exist in corporate governance of many special factors, and these particularities will affect the efficiency of corporate governance to a great extent. In view of the previous research on corporate governance of mixed ownership enterprises from the general framework of governance structure, this paper innovatively proposes the research hypothesis based on the particularity of corporate governance model of mixed ownership enterprises. The conclusion is different from the previous research, such as, the co-office of the chairman and the general manager will not significantly reduce the efficiency of corporate governance; ＂old governance structure＂ is integrated into the new corporate governance mechanism in the listed companies, and it has played a role in supervising and monitoring, thus reducing the number of violations of the company. The effect of executive compensation incentive on the efficiency of corporate governance is not significant. It provides a useful theoretical reference for the optimization of corporate governance structure of mixed ownership enterprises.