摘要
建立政府和开发商的利润函数,基于博弈理论研究不同政策对政府和开发商利润的影响及不同政策下政府和开发商的选择。结果表明:开发补贴政策和装配式技术支持政策对开发商利润影响比土地购置优惠政策影响大,且影响程度随着装配式建筑开发量的增加而增加;而在装配式建筑开发量较小时,对现浇式建筑增税政策对开发商利润影响更大;开发补贴政策和装配式技术支持政策的累计补贴量低于土地购置优惠政策,为装配式建筑的推广提供理论依据。
Establish government's and developers' profit function based on game theory to study the effects of different policies to government's and developers' profit and their choices according to different policies. The results show: the effects of the development subsidy policy and the technical support to the prefabricated are deeper than the land purchase preferential policy,also,the effects will become deeper and deeper as the development quantity of prefabricated building grows; When the development quantity of prefabricated building is small,the tax policy is more useful to affect developers' profit; the total subsidy of the development subsidy policy and the technical support to the prefabricated are lower than the land purchase preferential policy,providing theoretical basis for the generalization of prefabricated building.
作者
张果瑞
Zhang Guorui(Zhengzhou University of Industry Technology, Zhengzhou 451100, Chin)
出处
《山西建筑》
2018年第21期240-242,共3页
Shanxi Architecture
关键词
装配式建筑
开发商
政策
利润
Key words : prefabricated building
developers
policy
profit