基于不同基金补贴方式的闭环供应链模型比较研究

Comparative Research of Closed-loop Supply Chain Models Based on Different Fund Subsidy Methods

本文构建了在制造商主导下,由制造商和销售商组成的闭环供应链,运用博弈理论,根据不同的补贴分配方式,分别探讨了政府仅补贴拆解企业及同时补贴拆解企业和回收企业的两类闭环供应链模型。研究结果表明:制造商和销售商更倾向于同时补贴拆解企业和回收企业的闭环供应链系统,此时产品的销售价格更低,市场需求量与回收率更高,相应的系统总利润也更优。同时补贴拆解企业和回收企业时,市场需求量和回收率均与制造商补贴分配比例正相关,销售价格与制造商补贴分配比例负相关;节点企业利润与销售商补贴分配比例正相关,闭环供应链系统利润与制造商补贴分配比例负相关。

Under the structure of manufacturer-leading,a closed-loop supply chain model is constructed,which is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The Stackelberg game theory is utilized to discuss and analyze two types of CLSC models through the changes of subsidy policies and the proportion of distribution of subsidies,respectively. One is that the government only subsidizes the manufacturer with dismantling qualification; the other is that the subsidies object includes both dismantling and collecting enterprises. It is found that： the manufacturer and retailer prefer to the model under the simultaneous subsidies. At this point,the lower selling prices,the higher market demand and recovery rate maximize the corresponding profits of the whole supply chain system. When dismantling and recycling enterprises are subsidized simultaneously,the market demand and recovery rate have positive correlation with,while the prices are just the opposite. The profits of node enterprises are positively related to,system profit is negative correlation with.