摘要
随着我国近年来老龄化程度的不断加深,养老保险的可持续性问题得到广泛关注。一方面,我国养老保险统筹级次低,养老保险大数互济、精算平衡的内在功能难以有效发挥,一些地方甚至出现了养老金发放困难;另一方面,国家养老保险统筹级次提高之后,又面临如何有效调动地方积极性、养老责任由地方向中央"倒置"的难题。养老保险的统筹层次与国家的社会保障水平密切相关,基于养老保险省级统筹已基本完成的现状,养老保险的全国统筹制度也已提上日程。养老保险中央调剂制度作为养老保险全国统筹的过渡性政策,其重要性不言而喻。从养老保险中央调剂制度所带来的中央政府与地方政府的博弈出发,运用委托—代理模型详细分析了中央政府与地方政府博弈的内在机理,提出由中央政府给予地方政府一定的激励,以消除二者博弈带来的效率损失,实现养老保险中央调剂制度下的激励相容。
With the deepening of aging degree in China in recent years,the sustainability of endowment insurance has attracted wide attention. Since China endowment insurance is of overall low grade,the intrinsic function of mutual benefit and actuarial balance of endowment insurance is difficult to play effectively and some places even have difficulties in pension payment. On the other hand,after the overall grade of the national endowment insurance is improved,such difficult problems as how to effectively mobilize the local enthusiasm and the " inversion" of the responsibility for the aged from the local government to the central government are faced. The overall level of endowment insurance is closely related to the level of national social security. Based on the fact that the overall plan of the provincial insurance has basically been completed,the overall national endowment insurance system has also been put on the agenda. As a transitional policy for the overall planning of the old-age insurance,the importance of the central endowment insuranc adjustment system is self-evident. Based on the game between the central government and the local government brought about by central endowment insurance adjustment system and by using principal-agent model,this paper analyzes the internal mechanism of the game between the central government and the local government and proposes that the central government should give local governments a certain incentive to eliminate the efficiency loss caused by the two-party game and realize the incentive compatibility under the central endowment insuranc adjustment system.
作者
白彦锋
王秀园
BAI Yanfeng;WANG Xiuyuan(School of Public Finance and Tax,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 102206,China)
出处
《山东财经大学学报》
2018年第4期65-74,共10页
Journal of Shandong University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目"我国雾霾成因及财政综合治理问题研究"(15AZZ010)
关键词
养老保险
中央调剂
激励相容
endowment insurance
central adjustment
incentive compatibility