中国农业污染的理论与实证分析——政治经济学视角下的经验证明

The Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Agricultural Pollution in China:Empirical Evidence from the Perspective of Political Economics

新时代满足人民美好生活的需求离不开优质清洁的农产品,农业污染问题不仅威胁食品安全,而且不利于农业绿色转型。本文从政治经济学利益分析的视角切入,对农业污染问题进行了理论分析和实证考察,研究结果显示:短期内经济利益与环境利益存在竞争关系,农户对经济利益的迫切需求决定其更偏好于前者;地方政府不合理的激励机制会鼓励这种行为,加剧了农业的污染程度;有效的制度安排约束了人们行为选择的边界,能有效降低农业污染水平。此外,本文还进一步分析了农业污染的区域异质性特征。防治农业污染应统筹好经济利益和环境利益的关系,完善相应的制度安排和监督管理机制,设计全面的政绩考核激励机制以及多样化的财政支农方式。

In the new era,the needs to satisfy people ＇ s good life are inseparable from high quality and clean agricultural products. The problem of agricultural pollution not only threatens food safety,but also go against the green transformation of agriculture. From the perspective of interest analysis of political economics,this paper makes a theoretical analysis and empirical research on the problem of agricultural pollution. The results show that firstly there is a competitive relationship between economic interests and environmental interests in the short term.The urgent demand for economic interests of farmers decides that they prefer the former. Secondly,the irrational incentive mechanism of local governments encourages the behavior, and aggravates the pollution degree of agriculture. Thirdly,effective institutional arrangements constrain the boundaries of people＇s behavior choices,and can effectively reduce the level of agricultural pollution. In addition,the paper further analyzes the regional heterogeneity of agricultural pollution. The prevention and control of agricultural pollution should be integrated with the relationship between economic interests and environmental benefits,perfect the corresponding institutional arrangements and supervision mechanism,design a comprehensive system of political performance assessment and diversified financial agricultural-support methods.