管理者风险特质、盈余管理与盈余持续性

Manager's risk character, earnings management and earnings persistence

以2011—2016年A股上市公司主板及中小板上市公司为研究样本,从委托代理理论和盈余管理理论视角论述管理者风险特质、盈余管理与盈余持续性之间存在的理论关系,并尝试运用计量经济学模型进行实证研究。研究结果表明管理者风险特质与盈余持续性存在负向相关关系;另外,盈余管理在管理者特质对盈余持续性的影响中充当部分中介作用。具体来说,风险偏好型管理者趋向于通过盈余管理的方式来粉饰财务报表以达到预期的目的,而且风险偏好程度越大所采取的盈余管理程度越大;管理者的盈余管理程度越大,企业盈余持续性越弱。研究结果有助于丰富盈余持续性相关理论,对探寻提高盈余持续性的途径具有现实意义。

Taking the A-share listed companies on the main board and on the small and medium-sized board as research samples from 2011 to 2016, the article deals with the manager＇s risk character and the theoretical relationship between earnings management and earnings persistence from the perspective of principal-agent theory and earnings management theory, and tries to make an empirical study with the econometric model. The results show that there is a negative correlation between manager＇s risk character and earnings persistence. In addition, earnings management plays an intermediary role in the effect of manager＇s character on earnings persistence. Specifically, risk preference manager tends to sugar up financial statement to achieve the expected goal by means of earnings management. The greater the risk preference extent is, the greater the earnings management extent is. The greater the manager＇s earnings management extent is, the weaker the enterporise＇s earnings persistence is. The results of the study are helpful to enriching the theory of earnings persistence, which is of practical significance to exploring the way to improve earnings persistence.