摘要
海德格尔的早期哲学同胡塞尔现象学的关系一直是哲学界争论的热点问题之一。海德格尔在早期著作中一方面批评胡塞尔的现象学把意识和理论活动看成是人的根本存在方式,遗忘了人的具体存在;另一方面又坚持认为真正的存在论只有作为现象学才是可能的,并且声称他坚持了现象学的基本原则。文章从海德格尔的《哲学的观念与世界观问题》《现象学研究导论》和《存在与时间》等早期著作入手,详细探讨了他在什么意义上批评胡塞尔的"反思现象学"并且提出自己的"解释学的现象学"。但文章同时也指出,海德格尔对于胡塞尔现象学的批评过于简单化,并且包含了不少误解。事实上,海德格尔早期关于存在和存在者的"存在论区分"的前提是存在变成了现象,也就是存在者的自身显现。而将存在者的存在还原为现象或存在者的自身显现,正是胡塞尔的先验现象学的核心思想。就这一点来说,胡塞尔与早期的海德格尔并没有根本分歧。文章最后认为,海德格尔早期现象学的根本突破在于将遮蔽或非本真性看成现象的内在要素,这既是他的现象学超出胡塞尔现象学的地方,也是他后来的哲学转向的重要动力。
The relationship between Heidegger's early philosophy and Husserl's phenomenology has always been a focus of philosophical controversies. In his early writings, Heidegger criticizes Husserl's phenomenology on the account that the latter understands consciousness as the fundamental activity of human beings and neglects their factual being. Nevertheless, Heidegger insists that his philosophy adheres to the fundamental principle of phenomenology. This paper seeks to clarify both Heidegger's idea of "hermeneutical phenomenology" and his critiques of Husserl's "reflective phenomenology". One premise of Heidegger's difference between Being (Sein) and being (Seiende) is that Being (Sein) is regarded as phenomenon, namely, the self showing of being (Seiende). Similarly, the key point of Husserl's phenomenology is to restore the Being of being as phenomenon or the self showing of being. Insofar as this point is concerned, there is no essential difference between Heidegger's " hermeneutical phenomenology" and Husserl's " reflective phenomenology". However, the fundamental breakthrough of Heidegger's early phenomenology is considering veiling and uneigentlichkeit the inherent factors of phenomenon. It is where Heidegger's early phenomenology differs from and exceeds Husserl's phenomenology and also a driving force for the turn of his philosophy later.
作者
吴增定
WU Zeng ding(Department of Philosophy,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)
出处
《同济大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第3期1-13,共13页
Journal of Tongji University:Social Science Edition