国资委准入管制与国有企业审计质量——基于国有上市公司2007—2015年的数据

Entry Regulation Imposed by SASAC and Audit Quality of SOEs:Based on 2007—2015 Data of State-owned Listed Companies in China

通过入围招标、设置中介机构备选库等方式,各级国有资产管理部门对国有企业审计市场实施了隐性的准入管制。利用国有上市公司和证券资格所2007—2015年的数据,发现国资委的入围招标并不能实现信息的充分利用,获得国资委准入资格的会计师事务所(简称入围事务所)以业绩配对的操控性应计项目绝对值和非标准审计意见衡量的审计质量,并不显著高于未入围的会计师事务所;然而,同期名牌事务所与非名牌事务所相比却具有显著更高的审计质量,这一质量差异在利用倾向得分配对(PSM)方法控制了可能存在的内生性问题之后仍然存在。研究发现表明,市场自发形成的审计师声誉是比政府授予的准入资格更可靠的审计质量信号,国资委对于国有企业审计市场的准入管制并未达到预期的政策目的。

By promoting the＂Bidding for the Bidding Qualifications＂programs,the establishment of an official list of qualified accounting firms and other approaches,the State-owned Asset Administration Bureaus at all levels imposes an implicit entry regulation on the audit market for SOEs. Based on the 2007—2015 data of State-owned listed companies and those accounting firms with the licenses to audit listed companies,it is discovered that the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission（ SASAC） is not in a position to make full use of information during the entry regulation process,and those accounting firms granted the qualifications to audit SOEs by SASAC cannot provide higher audit quality（ proxied by the absolute value of discretional accruals and Modified Audit Opinions） than those accounting firms without such qualifications. However,those accounting firms with a brand-name reputation deliver higher audit quality than those firms without such a reputation within the same period. This conclusion still holds after the potential endogeneity problem is addressed by means of Propensity Score Matching（ PSM） method. The findings indicate that auditors＇ reputation is more reliable in signaling audit quality than the government-granted qualifications and that the entry regulation imposed by SASAC hasn＇t achieved its expected objectives.