董事高管责任保险会增加公司的审计费用吗?

Will D&O Insurance Increases Audit Fees of Corporations?

信息不对称程度较高时,董事高管责任保险(D&O保险)常常引发管理层更多的机会主义行为,这会影响审计师对于被审计单位的风险预期和审计定价。以我国2007—2016年沪深A股上市公司为样本,考察了D&O保险的购买对于公司审计费用的影响。研究发现,购买D&O保险会增加公司的审计费用;同时我们还发现,在低市场化程度以及高盈余管理的条件下,D&O保险与公司审计费用的正相关关系更加明显;进一步分析D&O影响公司审计费用的内在机理后发现,D&O保险、公司诉讼风险和公司审计费用之间存在显著的中介效应,这说明D&O保险是通过公司诉讼风险进而影响审计费用的。

The Director and Officer＇s Liability Insurance often causes more opportunistic behavior when information is asymmetric,then risk expectations and audit fees from auditors will be influenced. Using the data of Chinese listed companies between 2007—2016 as samples,this paper studies the influence on the audit fees after the introduction of DO insurance. The study reveals that the introduction of DO insurance will increase audit fees. Furthermore,low level of marketization process and high level of earning management will strengthen the positive relationship between the introduction of DO insurance and audit fees. We also test the relationship between DO insurance and litigation risks,and find out they are positively associated. This reveals that auditors charge high audit fees to the corporations which introduced DO insurance for facing high litigation risks.