摘要
检验了企业的设定受益型企业年金(DB计划)与企业投资效率之间的关系,以此揭示中国情境下企业年金的公司治理作用。利用手工收集的2013—2016年参与DB计划的A股上市公司数据,并通过倾向评分匹配法为实施DB计划的企业筛选出对照组样本,以此来控制样本自选择问题。研究发现:实施DB计划的企业相较于未实施DB计划的企业,具有更高的投资效率。对两条可能的作用机制的检验发现,在股东高管代理冲突更严重组中,DB计划降低非效率投资的效果更明显,表明其通过激励机制起作用;在破产威胁更严重组中,DB计划降低非效率投资的效果更明显,表明其通过利益趋同机制起作用。研究结论对于进一步认清DB计划的实施收益具有重要的意义。
This paper examines the relationship between the defined benefit pension( DB plan) and the efficiency of the enterprise investment,thus revealing the corporate governance role of defined benefit pension in China. In this paper,we use the manually collected data of A-share listed companies participating in the DB plan from 2013 to 2016,and select the sample of the control group for the enterprises that implement the DB plan by the trend score matching method to control the sample selfselection problem. The results of the empirical test show that companies with DB plans have higher investment efficiency than those who do not implement the DB plan. In this paper,the test of two possible mechanisms of action found that DB plan to reduce the efficiency of inefficient investment is more obvious in the more serious group of shareholders' agency conflict,indicating that it plays a role through the incentive mechanism; in the more serious group of bankruptcy threats,DB plans to reduce the efficiency of inefficient investment is more obvious,indicating that it plays a role through the benefit convergence mechanism. This article is of great significance for further understanding of the implementation of the DB program.
作者
卢太平
韩春梅
LU Taiping;HAN Chunmei(School of Accounting,Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Bengbu 233030,Chin)
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第4期66-74,共9页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
安徽财经大学研究生科研创新基金项目(ACYC2016191)
关键词
设定受益型企业年金
内部负债
投资效率
股东-管理者冲突
股东-债权人冲突
代理成本
破产风险
defined benefit pension
internal debt
investment efficiency
stockholdermanager conflicts
stockholder-bondholder conflicts
agent costs
risk of bankruptcy