融资约束、代理成本与企业非效率研发投资研究——来自湖北省上市公司的经验证据

Research on Financing Constraints,Agency Costs and Enterprise Inefficient R&D Investment——Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies in Hubei Province

通过构建一个异质性双边随机边界模型,以湖北省上市公司为样本,定量考察了融资约束和代理成本对企业非效率研发投资的影响方向及程度。结果表明:(1)融资约束和代理成本对企业研发投资水平具有重要影响,并且,融资约束对企业研发投资的影响程度强于代理成本;(2)整体上湖北企业研发投资较最优水平低18.05%,但约32.84%的公司研发投资高于最优水平,约59%的公司研发投资不足程度超过10%;(3)企业非效率研发投资的异质性较强,地方国有企业和民营企业普遍研发投资不足,中央国有企业研发投资效率较高。创新引领中"政府之手"作用的有效发挥应考虑对不同企业分类施策、精准引导。

By constructing a two-tier heterogeneity stochastic frontier model and taking listed companies in Hubei province as samples,this paper quantitatively investigates the direction and extent of financing constraints and agency costs on the inefficient RD investment of enterprises.The results show that：first,financing constraints and agency costs have an important impact on RD investment of enterprises,among which,financing constraints have more influence on RD investment of enterprises than agency costs.Second,on the whole,investment in RD of Hubei enterprises is 18.05%lower than the optimal level,but about 32.84%of companies invest more than the optimal RD investment,and about 59%of companies invest less than 10%in RD investment.Third,the heterogeneity of inefficient RD investment is strong,and the local state-owned enterprises and non-public enterprises is generally under-RD Investment,however,the RD investment of central state-owned enterprises is more efficient.The effective play of the role of ＂ hand of government＂ in innovation leading should consider the categorization and decision-making to different enterprises and precise guidance.