群体理性决策的博弈与逻辑分析

On Rational Conditions of Collective Decision-making based on Logic and Game Theory

群体理性确定是社会选择理论的一个关键问题。"阿罗不可能性定理"似乎否定了群体理性决策的可能。分析阿罗不可能定理产生的条件,然后基于对聚合规则的逻辑刻画,讨论避免不可能性的几种可能解决方案。然而,理性群体决策的生成绝不仅仅是聚合规则的选择问题,还需要考虑个体间的互动影响,既看到各成员之间基本利益的一致,又看到成员之间的利益冲突,从博弈的角度来讨论群体理性聚合中的策略操纵和防御问题。

It is a key issue to get collective rationality in social choice theory, and Arrow＇ s impossibility theorem seems have denied the possibility of rational collective decisions. The purpose of this paper is, first, to introduce those conditions that lead to Arrow＇s theorem; second, to show several ways to avoid impossibility re- suits based on logic language. However, it is not just choosing among rules to get rational collective decisions, but also need to consider these influences of interconnections between individuals; anyway, those members have both consistent basic interests and inconsistent or even conflict personal interests; thus third, to describe strategic voting and analyze strategic proof in rational collective decision making from game theoretic view.