摘要
众所周知,由于克里普克的工作,弗雷格的涵义理论被普遍认为是无效的。但事实上,弗雷格的理论真的被克里普克决定性地反驳了吗?这是一个有趣而富于挑战的问题。本文认为,克里普克对涵义理论的典型反驳并没有击中涵义理论的关键;毋宁说,克里普克树立了一个反驳的目标并将其归到弗雷格身上,但问题在于,这个被设想的目标并不能恰当地归于弗雷格。本文通过对弗雷格涵义理论之所以被提出的论证的重构,以及对克里普克反驳的评述,来解释为什么克里普克并未真正击倒弗雷格。以之为基础,本文论证了涵义概念是可以辩护的,但不是在"新弗雷格主义"的路径上去辩护,而必须以"约定"概念为核心来对其给予辩护。
As we all know,it seems a comprehensive accepted notion that Frege's theory of sense had been decisively refuted by Kripke in his remarkable arguments which known as modal argument,epistemic argument and semantic argument.But isn't there any question about this understanding? In fact,I will argue that the story is not so simple as long as we restate the argument which Frege had offered in order to introduce Sense.I will coin Frege's argument as"Pragmatic Argument"and further claim that Kripke's refutation of Frege didn't give us any reason to throw away the notion of Sense at all,that is to say,Kripke missed the target with respect to Frege's"Pragmatic Argument".So I conclude that the notion of Sense is defensible in terms of linguistic"Convention"rather than the Neo-Fregeanism strategies of analyzing Sense.
出处
《价值论与伦理学研究》
2017年第2期117-129,共13页
Axiology and Ethics
关键词
涵义
克里普克
新弗雷格主义
约定
theory of sense
Kripke
Neo-Fregeanism
convention.