摘要
住房保障资源的市场化配置模式在总体上比政府行政配置模式更有优势。运用博弈论的方法,通过政府与住房保障资源申请者之间的博弈分析,证明如果政府恰当地设计住房保障资源申请者的参与约束条件和伪装成本,就可以在住房市场上通过保障对象的市场选择行为有效地实现住房保障资源与保障对象的"对号入座"和自动匹配。
On the whole,the market-oriented model for allocating indemnificatory housing is superior to the government intervention configuration mode. This paper adopts the game theory to analyze the relationship between government and the applicants for indemnificatory housing resources. It is proved that if the government properly designs the constraint conditions and disguised costs of applicants,then automatic matching between indemnificatory housing and applicants can be achieved through the market selection behavior of the guaranteed applicants.
出处
《五邑大学学报(社会科学版)》
2018年第3期51-56,共6页
Journal of Wuyi University(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
住房保障
博弈
市场化配置
Indemnificatory housing
Game theory
Market allocation