官员晋升激励、国家审计免疫与地方政府债务——基于省级面板数据的实证研究

Official Promotion Incentive,National Auditing Immunity and Local Government Debt——An Empirical Study Based on the Provincial-level Panel Data

政绩利益环境下以GDP为导向的官员晋升考核机制成为刺激地方政府债务规模扩张的重要动机,国家审计理应发挥债务风险控制的免疫功能。文章运用2008-2015年省级面板数据,针对官员晋升激励、国家审计免疫对于地方政府债务的影响程度开展实证研究;结果显示:地方政府债务存量普遍较高,公开发债数额呈明显增加趋势;官员晋升激励与地方政府债务存在显著正相关关系;国家审计免疫与地方政府债务不存在显著相关,但审计揭示、抵御和预防功能皆能弱化官员晋升激励对地方政府债务扩张的影响程度。优化官员政绩考核体制,建立面向地方政府债务的审计治理机制,充分发挥审计免疫功能对于抑制地方政府债务风险具有重要意义。

In the context of political achievements,the evaluation mechanism of official promotion guided by the GDP has become an important incentive to stimulate the expansion of local government debt scale. The national auditing is supposed to play a role in auditing immune function of control debt risk. This paper,using the provincial-level panel data from 2008 to 2015,conducts an empirical study on the impacts of official promotion incentive and national auditing immunity on local government debt. The results show that： The stock of local government debt is generally on the high level,and the circulation of local government debt increases obviously; There is a significant positive correlation between the promotion of officials and local government debt; There is no significant correlation between national auditing immunity and local government debt,but the national auditing function of disclosure,resistance and prevention can weaken the influence of official promotion incentive on local government debt expansion. Optimizing the system of official achievements assessment,establishing the auditing governance mechanism for local government debt and giving full play to the auditing immune function are of great significance to restraining the risk of local government debt.