薪酬管制、激励溢出与国企社会成本:一项准自然实验

Payment Ceiling,Incentive Spillover and Social Costs of SOEs:a Quasi Natural Experiment

以2004—2016年上市公司为研究对象,基于锦标赛理论和准自然实验方法,检验2009年和2014年两次针对国企高管的薪酬管制措施的政策效果,并进一步检验了国企混合所有制改革的政策意义。采用DID方法的实证结果表明:薪酬管制政策通过晋升激励增加了国企社会成本,表现为晋升激励与国企异常捐赠支出、冗员负担正相关;但股权激励会弱化晋升激励与国企社会成本的相关关系。进一步地,通过研究不同环境下国企社会成本,发现较高的市场化程度、行业竞争程度和商业类国企表现出更高的社会成本,也即薪酬管制对这些国企高管的政策冲击更强。本文结论提供了薪酬管制的经验证据并在实证上支持了国企混合所有制改革,为进一步理顺政府与市场的关系及国企内部激励机制改革提供了借鉴。

This paper did an empirical research to test the policy effect of payment ceiling in 2009 and 2014 and composite-ownership reform in 2017,which aimed at senior executives of state-owned enterprises（ SOEs）. We choose the data of listing company during the year of 2004-2016 and adopt the tournament theory. The consequences that result from difference-in-difference（ DID） method indicate that the payment ceiling stimulate higher social donation,more redundancy by virtue of promotion incentive. But stock option incentive exert negative influence on the relation between promotion incentive and social costs. Furthermore,this find that in higher degree of marketization,industrial competition and public interest SOEs the relationship between promotion incentive and social costs is not so strong compared with the counterpart.