基于风险厌恶零售商的双渠道闭环供应链运作策略

Operation Strategies of a Dual-channel Closed-loop Supply Chain with a Risk-averse Retailer

在对称信息框架下,针对零售商存在风险厌恶特性的双渠道闭环供应链,基于Stackelberg博弈理论探讨了不同的回收再制造模式下(制造商不回收再制造、制造商独立回收再制造、制造商依托零售商回收再制造)供应链各主体的运作决策。研究发现,在不同回收再制造模式下,制造商与风险厌恶的零售商合作能够获得更多收益。市场波动的增大对供应链各主体并非始终是有害的,随着市场波动的增大,带有风险厌恶的零售商收益不断减小,而风险中性的双渠道制造商收益逐步增大,零售商风险厌恶特性为制造商带来了更多的收益。制造商独立回收再制造以及通过零售商进行回收再制造时,双渠道产品定价均低于不进行任何回收再制造模式下的定价,双渠道需求和利润均高于不进行任何回收再制造模式下的渠道需求和利润,即回收再制造模式不仅为下游顾客带来了更多的消费实惠,同时也为供应链各主体带来了更多的收益。

In the case of symmetric information framework, a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain model is considered, in which the retailer is risk-averse. By the Stackelberg game theory, the different recovery and remanu-facturing modes （recovered by nobody, the manufacturer or the retailer） are constructed to dispose the supply chain operation decision problem. It is showed that the risk neutral manufacturer is more willing to cooperate with the risk-averse retailer. Compared with the three different recovery and remanufacturing modes, it shows that the strategy of recovery and remanufacturing can effectively increases the two partners＇ profit. Finally, we provide a detailed numerical example to illustrate the mode and give some meaningful management implications.