反腐败与审计定价

Anti-corruption and Audit Pricing

本文考察中国反腐败如何影响审计定价。结果表明相比没有政治关联的公司,具有政治关联的公司在2012年之后支付的审计费用提高了38%。反腐败提高了与财务报告质量和经营不确定性相关的审计风险是其影响审计定价的重要渠道。横截面测试结果表明当反腐败的地区影响力较大、审计师议价能力较强时,反腐败对审计定价的影响更大。而且,在2012年之后政治关联公司的审计质量有所提高。本文结论有助于理解反腐败对不同市场参与者的影响。

This paper examines how Chinese anti-corruption affects audit pricing. We find that auditors react to the increased auditing risk resulting from anti-corruption and charge higher audit fees to the politically-connected firms. Further, we find that the impact only exists when the influence of anti-corruption is larger or when auditors have greater bargaining powers. Finally, we also find that after anti-corruption, the DAC and the probability of issuing an unqualified opinion of politically-connected finns are reduced. Our findings provide further insight into effect of anti-corruption on auditors in audit pricing decisions.