摘要
基于Hotelling模型,构建线性城市上两个具有运输成本差异的替代品序贯拍卖模型.在一般分布的条件下,分析买者的均衡报价及其特征,并探讨拍卖的有效性条件.进一步,从卖者收益最大化的角度,分析物品的最优位置.结果表明:与Hotelling双寡头垄断博弈不同,两物品的最优位置不会重合.研究结果可为具有运输成本差异的多物品拍卖机制的设计和改进提供一定的科学指导.
Using the Hotelling model, we describes a class of close substitutes with transportation costdifferences. Under general distribution conditions, this work analyzed equilibrium bids as well as theircharacteristics, and discussed the efficiency conditions of auctions. Furtherly, optimal locations of objects werederived. Being different from the results in the Hotelling duopoly game, this work found that optimal locationsof objects were non-overlapped. This study may provide guidance and suggestions on the design andoptimization of auction mechanisms for substitutes with transportation cost differences.
作者
胡二琴
郭娇
赵勇
黄毅
HU Erqin;GUO Jiao;ZHAO Yong;HUANG Yi(College of Science,Hubei University of Technology,Wuhan 430068,China;College of Automation,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430074,China)
出处
《湖北大学学报(自然科学版)》
CAS
2018年第5期470-477,481,共9页
Journal of Hubei University:Natural Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(71201064
71471069)
湖北省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(17Q068)资助
关键词
序贯拍卖
关联估价
替代品
拍卖有效性
最优位置
sequential auctions
correlated valuation
substitutes
auctions efficiency
optimal location