一类近似替代品序贯拍卖中的均衡分析与收益优化

Equilibrium analysis and revenue optimization in sequential auctions for a class of close substitutes

基于Hotelling模型,构建线性城市上两个具有运输成本差异的替代品序贯拍卖模型.在一般分布的条件下,分析买者的均衡报价及其特征,并探讨拍卖的有效性条件.进一步,从卖者收益最大化的角度,分析物品的最优位置.结果表明:与Hotelling双寡头垄断博弈不同,两物品的最优位置不会重合.研究结果可为具有运输成本差异的多物品拍卖机制的设计和改进提供一定的科学指导.

Using the Hotelling model, we describes a class of close substitutes with transportation costdifferences. Under general distribution conditions, this work analyzed equilibrium bids as well as theircharacteristics, and discussed the efficiency conditions of auctions. Furtherly, optimal locations of objects werederived. Being different from the results in the Hotelling duopoly game, this work found that optimal locationsof objects were non-overlapped. This study may provide guidance and suggestions on the design andoptimization of auction mechanisms for substitutes with transportation cost differences.