上市公司高管激励机制对审计费用的影响研究

Research on the Effect of Incentive Mechanisms to Audit Fees in Listed Companies

为探究上市公司高管激励机制对审计费用的影响,围绕高管薪酬激励和高管股权激励两种机制,建立实证模型衡量其对审计费用的影响。研究结果表明,审计费用随高管薪酬激励水平的提高而增加,说明高管薪酬激励水平越高意味着审计费用越高;审计费用随高管股权激励水平的提升而降低,说明上市公司可通过提升股权激励水平来降低审计费用。因此,该研究丰富了相关理论成果,并提出了公司治理的相关建议,对我国审计定价也具有一定的参考意义。

In order to explore the inffluence of the incentive mechanism of the listed company executives on the audit costs, there are two main mechanisms： executive compensation incentive and executive equity incentive to establish an empirical model to measure its impact on audit fees. The results show that the audit fee increases with the improvement of the executive compensa-tion incentive level, indicating that the higher the level of executive compensation incentive in China means the higher the audit fee. The audit fee decreases with the improvement of the executive equity incentive level, indicating that the listed companies can reduce the audit fees by raising the level of equity incentive. Therefore, the research enriches the relevant theoretical results, and puts forward relevant suggestions on corporate governance, which also has certain reference significance to China＇s audit pricing.