不对称信息条件下销售渠道协调机制

Coordination of Distribution Channel under Asymmetric Information

销售渠道由供应商、零售商和消费者组成。这其中,零售商销售服务水平对消费者需求有着重要影响。然而服务水平提升具有双重效应:一方面它可以促进消费者需求,而另一方面却伴随着销售成本的增加。因而不对称信息条件下,如果零售商服务水平不能被供应商准确监测时,零售商会选择对自己而不是对供应商最有利的服务水平,从而损害供应商的利益。这引发了新的问题——供应商应该设计怎样的协调机制,才能促使零售商提高服务水平、进而最大化自己的利益?文章就该问题进行了针对性研究。考虑到两种典型策略:批发价格策略、批发价格与超目标奖混合策略,构建了相应的协调模型。结果表明,与批发价格策略相比,混合策略能够促进零售商提高服务水平、实现供应商与零售商共赢,并有效提升供应链整体绩效。

Distribution channel consists of manufacturers, re-tailers and customers, among which the retail service offered by the retailer plays an important role in motivating the de-mands of customers. However, two conflicting effects arise due to improving the retail service： although good service promotes customer demand, it really increases the retail costs. So under the asymmetric information condition that the retail service cannot be observed by the supplier, the retailer will choose the optimal service to maximize his profits, leaving the disad-vantage to the supplier. It leads to a new problem： for the supplier, how to design a coordination mechanism to stimulate the retailer to provide good service, as well as to improve his profits？ This paper focuses on the problem. Decision models are presented and comparisons are performed based on two strategies, i. e., wholesale pricing strategy, and mixed strategy ＋wholesale pricing plus a sales-rebate contract）. The analyses show that compared with wholesale pricing strategy, mixed strategy can effectively improve the retail service, as well as the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. Moreover, it can achieve better coordination of the channel.