知性论中的感性直观形式——以时间为切入点看牟宗三否认物自身之不可知的原因

Sensuous Intuition Formality in the Theory of Intellectuality——Investigation into the Reason for Mou Zongsan's Denial of the Agnosticity of Thing-initself from the Perspective of Time

牟宗三在赞扬康德对现象与物自身的区分的同时,以论证不充分为由,否定了康德认为物自身是不可知的观点。对所谓"论证不充分"的阐述并没有让牟宗三成功指出康德的错误,只是反映出二人的理解存在差异。对时间的不同解读是差异的重要体现。在康德那里,时间是一种感性直观的形式;牟宗三对时间的讨论却到达了知性层面,特别体现在他对"强度量"概念的讨论中。知性论中时间失去了在感性论中先天地排除物自身的机能,让康德关于物自身的不可知性的论证不再具有根基。差异的背后不仅仅是一方对另一方的误读,还暗含两种思想体系的碰撞;在其中,牟宗三的理论尝试不应被轻易否定。

Mou Zongsan denies Kant＇s view on the agnosticity of thing-in-itself for the reason of inadequate argument while appreciating Kant＇s distinction of phenomenon and thing-in-itself. Mou＇s illustration of the inadequate argument does not justify his accuse of Kant＇s mistake, and it merely reflects the difference between the understanding of them. The difference is epitomized by their different interpretation on time. Kant considers time as a form of sensuous intuition while Mou＇s inquiry of time has reached the cognitive level, as shown in his discussion on the concept of intensive quantity. In the theory of intellectuality, time has lost its innate exclusiveness of thing-in-itself as it does in the theory of sensibility, which has undermined the foundation of Kant＇s argument on the agnosticity of thing-in-itself. Behind the difference, there is not only the mutual misinterpretation of each other, but also the collision of two different ideological systems. Mou＇s theoretical attempts should not be denied easily.