摘要
作为后发国家,中国的专利制度主要通过4种作用机制来促进技术进步:提供技术线索实现逆向工程;通过知识产权保护促进技术交易;提供技术知识实现差异化的模仿创新;发出信号完成创新资源在公共研究部门的配置。在主观博弈论分析框架下解析这4种机制的实现过程,研究认为:专利制度可以看成是主观博弈均衡的信息浓缩,当参与者的自身条件、所处外部环境和对专利制度的认知发生变化时,参与者的主观博弈形式和均衡结果也会改变,进而影响专利制度功能的发挥。因此,主观博弈论不仅可以解释中国企业利用专利制度提高自身技术进步的实现方式,还可以揭示出专利制度形成和演进的机理。
As a latecomer country, China's patent system mainly promotes technological progress through four mechanisms: providing technological clues to realize reverse engineering; promoting technology transaction through intellectual property protection; providing technical knowledge to achieve differentiated imitation and innovation; signal the allocation of innovative resources in public research departments. In the framework of subjective game theory analysis, this paper analyzes the realization process of these four mechanisms and concludes that, the patent system can be regarded as the information concentration of the subjective game equilibrium, when the participants' own conditions, the external environment and the cognition of the patent system change, the form of subjective game and the equilibrium result of the participants will also change, which will affect the function of the patent system. Therefore, the subjective game theory can not only explain how Chinese enterprises use the patent system to improve their technological progress, but also reveal the mechanism of the formation and evolution of the patent system.
作者
刘元刚
蒙大斌
Liu Yuangang;Meng Dabin(Tianjin Science and Technology Workers Entrepreneurship,Tianjin 300041,China;Tianjin Commercial University,Tianjin 300134,China)
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第15期53-58,共6页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"专利
风险资本融资与创新创业绩效:理论
实证与应用"(16YJC790075)
关键词
专利制度
有效性
创新激励
知识扩散
R&D投入
patent system
effectiveness
innovation motivation
knowledge diffusion
R&D investment