基于费用归类操纵视角的“八项规定”有效性研究--来自中国上市公司的证据

On the Effectiveness of “the Eight-point Guidelines of the CPC” in Chinese Listed Companies from the Perspective of Expense Classification Shifting

使用2010年~2015年A股上市公司数据,运用PSM-DID研究方法,基于费用归类操纵视角考察了"八项规定"在国有企业中的政策效应。结果表明,"八项规定"对公款消费进行约束后,国有企业存在利用会计科目进行费用归类操纵的现象,即将部分原计入管理费用中的公款消费,转移至资本性支出和非流动资产处置损失等非敏感性会计科目,且高管腐败程度高的国有企业是费用归类操纵的重灾区。国有企业表面看来减少了公款消费,实质却是通过费用归类操纵达到隐性腐败的目的。本文的研究揭示了隐性腐败账务处理的新路径,发现国有企业会利用非敏感性会计科目隐蔽公款消费,这为治理国有企业权力寻租和规避监管打开了一条新的通道。

Taking A-share listed companies in 2010-2015 as samples,and using PSM-DID,this paper examines the effectiveness of ＂the eight-point guidelines＂in state-owned enterprises from the perspective of expense classification shifting. The results show that as the ＂eight-point guidelines＂restrict public consumption,state-owned enterprises intentionally misclassify expenses,that is,they shift part of public consumption from administrative expenses to such non-sensitive accounts as capital expenditures accounts or losses from disposal of non-current assets. Further studies find that expense classification shifting will be more serious in state-owned enterprises with high levels of management corruption; State-owned enterprises appear to have reduced public consumption on the surface,but in essence,they achieve implicit corruption through expense classification shifting. Above all,this study illustrates the new path of implicit corruption accounting treatment,and reveals the existence of expense classification shifting using balance sheet accounts to hide public consumption,which contributes to the governance of rent-seeking and avoidance of supervision for stateowned enterprises.