股权分置改革视角下独立董事对议案事项监督机制研究

A Research on Supervision Mechanism of Independent Directors on Motion Items from the Perspective of Non-tradable Shares Reform

采用2005—2014年我国上市公司独立董事对议案事项意见的独特数据,从明确监管议案事项、非明确监管事项和股权分置改革等三方面深入考察其对独立董事出具否定意见的影响。研究发现,在我国上市公司中,对明确监管议案事项出具否定意见概率低,说明"逆淘汰"机制和"任人唯亲"董事会文化的存在使得监督效果大打折扣。同时发现,在股权分置改革后,独立董事对议案事项出具否定意见概率更低;出于规避法律风险的考虑,独立董事对明确监管事项出具否定意见的概率相对较高。因此,监管层应加强对各类议案事项检查力度而非仅仅明确监管事项;科学厘清独立董事在董事会决策中的责任边界,明确独立董事承担的法律风险。

Using the unique data about the opinions of the independent directors of listed companies in China from 2005 to 2014,this paper makes an in-depth study on the influence of the negative opinions issued by the independent directors from three aspects,such as the clear regulatory bill,the non clear regulatory matters and non-tradable shares reform. The study finds that in China＇s listed companies,there is a low probability of issuing negative opinions on clearly monitoring bills,which indicates that the supervision effect is greatly reduced due to the existence of the ＂Reverse Elimination＂mechanism and the＂Cronyism＂board culture. At the same time,after the non-tradable shares reform,independent directors have lower probability of issuing negative opinions on motion items. In order to avoid legal risks,independent directors have relatively high probability of issuing negative opinions on specific regulatory matters. Therefore,the policy implications are regulators should strengthen the types of motions matters and inspection efforts rather than just clear regulatory matters. In addition,it is also necessary to scientifically clarify the responsibility boundary of independent directors in the decision-making of the board of directors,and clarify the legal risks of independent directors.