通信技术标准下的专利许可争议——以美国法为例

Disputes over Standard Essential Patents(SEPs) Licensing in Telecommunication Industry under the US Regime

通信技术的发展与技术标准组织的成立密切相关。而技术标准组织成立的目的在于平衡技术开发的厂商与技术标准实施者间的利益。其中最重要的平衡工具为专利许可条款中的"公平合理与非歧视原则"(FRAND)。三大通讯标准组织的专利许可条款中阐述了FRAND存在的目的,然而在目前美国法下,FRAND条款存在实务与学理的争议:学理上的争议包括了反垄断以及专利绑架(Patent Hold Up)与专利孤立(Patent Hold Out)间的理论冲突;实务上则是公平合理与非歧视原则的解释争议。从FRAND条款解释上的困难,以及其背后不同的利益团体或学者学派所代表的不同立场而衍生出的"专利绑架""专利孤立"以及联合行为等反垄断的争议,都给未来的技术标准组织以及美国法院带来更多的不确定性和判决上的挑战。

The development of telecommunication technologies is highly related to the establishment of standard setting organizations （SSOs） and the purpose of the SSOs is to strike the balance between the incentives of standard-setting patents （SEPs） holders and the adoption of implementers. In order to strike that balance, one of key tools is by stipulating ＂fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory （FRAND）＂ principle in the SSOs＇ patent policies. We will analyze three famous SSOs＇ patent policies to deduct the purpose of the FRAND, as well as the in-depth discussions about the disputes of FRAND licensing in the legal scholarships and the federal courts under the U.S law. In the legal scholarships regime, the main disputes are the conflicts between the theories of patent holdup and patent holdout. Moreover, the antitrust issue also poised to be considered. In the practical area, the main debate of the interpretation of the FRAND is the specter for all the legal scholars and the federal courts. The complication of these conflicts and the debate challenges the capability of the judges in the U.S and other nations.