上市公司高管激励与会计稳健性——来自深交所上市公司的经验数据

Executive Incentive and Accounting Conservatism of Listed Companies——Empirical Data from Listed Companies of Shenzhen Stock Exchange

公司高管作为公司整体运营系统的领导者,担当着公司管理主要负责人的角色。以2011—2016年深交所A股上市公司为样本,数据以同花顺数据库为基础,分别从薪酬激励和股权激励两方面进行分析,论证高管激励对会计稳健性的影响。实证研究结果表明,高管股权激励对企业会计稳健性具有正相关作用;而高管薪酬激励对会计稳健性具有负相关作用。因此,在现代公司治理的社会背景下,完善我国上市公司高管激励机制对提高企业会计稳健性有一定的指导性作用,同时有利于市场稳定发展。

As the leader of the company＇s overall operation system,the company executives play the role of the main person in charge of company management.Taking the listed companies of a shares in 2011-2016 years as the sample,the data are based on the database of i Fin D,which are analyzed from two aspects of salary incentive and equity incentive,and the effect of executive incentive on accounting conservatism is demonstrated.The empirical results show that the executive equity incentive has a positive correlation with the accounting conservatism of the enterprise,and the executive compensation incentive has a negative correlation to the accounting conservatism.Therefore,under the social background of modern corporate governance,improving the incentive mechanism of senior executives of listed companies in China has a certain guiding role in improving the accounting conservatism of enterprises,and is conducive to the stable development of the market.