摘要
本文以2009—2014年间国有上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了国有企业内部的党组织在参与公司治理的情况下与国企过度投资之间的相关关系。研究发现,相比于党组织没能有效参与公司治理的国有企业,党组织参与公司治理能够有效抑制国企的过度投资。进一步研究发现,国企党组织治理与过度投资的负相关关系在央企中更为显著,在地方国企中作用较弱;同时,相比于商业类国企这种抑制作用在公益类国企中更为明显。
This paper make an empirical research on the relationship between party committee in SOEs and over-investment when committee take part in the management based on the data of listed SOEs during the year of 2009-2014. This paper indicates that when the party committee participate the management, over-investment in those firms is low compared with those firms in which committee can not participate. Our further study find that the function of party committee is stronger in central SOEs than in local SOEs. On the other hand, the function of committee to curtail the over-investment is lower in business SOEs than in public-interest SOEs. Other environment variables such as year and industry have no significant impact to our results.
出处
《财会通讯(下)》
北大核心
2018年第9期12-16,共5页
Communication of Finance and Accounting
关键词
国有企业
党组织治理
过度投资
State-owned enterprises(SOES)
Management of party committee
Over-investment