中美贸易谈判的权力结构与中国的策略选择

Power Structure of Sino-US Trade Negotiation and China's Strategic Choices

在中美贸易谈判诸多研究领域中,有关谈判分析框架和谈判权力的研究存在着明显空白。更为严重的是,目前谈判理论的片面和狭隘易使中方陷入被动、不利的境地。针对中美贸易谈判的复杂多变性和互动性,本文提出谈判权力结构是影响美国贸易政策转变的重要因素,并依据三层博弈分析框架来解读中美贸易谈判的全貌,进而指出中美贸易谈判是涉及"国际—国内—决策者"三层博弈之间互动的过程,谈判结果是国际权力结构、国内获胜集合与决策者认知交互作用的产物。通过构建中美贸易谈判模型,归纳出整体权力并非谈判方的权力来源,特定议题权力才是影响谈判结果的关键因素,并且国内获胜集合和决策者认知的变化都会引起权力结构的改变,信任更可能主导谈判进程和结果。鉴于谈判权力对谈判行为和结果的影响尤为显著,本文建议可以通过坚持策略、议题关联、改变对方的获胜集合等方法增强中国谈判权力。

In many research fields of Sino-US trade negotiations, there are no researches which are related to negotiation analysis framework and negotiation power. What is even more serious is that China can be easily put into a passive and unfavorable position by one-sidedness and narrowness of the current negotiation theory. In view of the complex and variability of trade negotiations between China and the United States, this paper proposes that the negotiating power structure is an important factor that influences the transformation of U.S. trade policy. According to the three-tier game analysis framework, it also interprets the overall picture of Sino-U.S. trade negotiations. Besides, this paper points out that the Sino-US trade negotiation is an interactive process involving three-tiered games which are "international-domestic-decision makers". The outcome of the negotiations is the product of the international power structure, the domestic winning set, and the cognitive interaction of the decision makers. By constructing negotiation model about the Sino-US trade, this paper concludes that the source of power for the negotiating parties is not the overall structural power. By contrast, the key factor which affects the outcome of the negotiations is the structural power of specific issues. Besides, changes in domestic winning sets and decision makers' perceptions will cause changes in the power structure. Trust is more likely to dominate the negotiation process and results. In view of the fact that negotiating power has a significant effect on negotiation behaviors and results, this paper suggests that China's bargaining power can be enhanced by insisting on strategies, issues, and changing the other's winning combination.