供应商面向多制造商技术研发决策演化博弈

本文运用演化博弈,从共性技术外部性、后续商业开发及政府支持方面分析了供应商面向多制造商技术研发决策演化及机理。研究表明:共性技术外部性使得博弈演化稳定于由研发不同技术供应商共存的均衡,研发损益参数对均衡有显著影响;共性技术后续商业开发难度对供应商研发决策的影响依其外部性强弱而定,随着后续开发难度增加,外部性较强促使供应商研发专用技术,反之则研发共性技术;政府支持激励着供应商研发共性技术,而技术支持对供应商研发行为具有更强的激励作用。根据上述结论,得出供应商技术研发决策四象限分析矩阵,并根据共性技术所处象限,从补贴、技术和其他支持视角提出权变运用的政策建议,为政府引导供应商技术研发决策提供参考。

This paper, which uses evolutionary game, analyzes the evolution and mechanism of supplier oriented multi-manufacturer technology R＆D decision-making under the generic technology externality, subsequent business development and government support. The results show that the generic technology externality makes the game evolution stable in the equilibrium of coexistence of different technology suppliers and the parameters of R＆D profit and loss have a significant impact on the equilibrium; the effect of subsequent developing difficulty of the generic technology on supplier＇s R＆D decisions depends on the degree of externality of generic technology, and with the increase of subsequent developing difficulty, the externality is strong to promote the supplier＇s R＆D specific technology, otherwise suppliers choose generic technology R＆D; government supports motivate suppliers to develop generic technology, and technology support has greater incentives for suppliers. Finally, this paper draws a four-quadrant analysis matrix of supplier＇s R＆D decision-making, and relevant policy suggestions are put forward from subsidies, technology and other supports, which provide the reference for government to guide supplier＇s technology R＆D decision-making.