海上风电并网的经济调控——将欧洲经验应用于中国(下)（英文）

Economic Regulation of Network Connection of Offshore Wind:Applying European Experience to China: Part Ⅱ

[目的]文章为两篇论文中的第二部分,着眼于将欧洲国家的经济调控管理经验应用于中国电力系统当前面临的紧迫挑战之一——海上风电的有效并网。[方法]文章通过分析比较调控机制,总结出海上风电监管机制的五个要素:监管实体、有效非绑定程度、补贴管理方法、并网价格制定方法以及责任主体。结合中国国家发改委2015年颁布的电改"9号文"分析了中国并网调控机制及相关机制的变化,这些变化包括为中国并网企业引入单独的经济调控机制,可形象称之为"管住中间、放开两头"。[结果]为了确保实现调控目标,如:配置效率、成本效率以及服务质量(包括陆上风电和海上风电的及时连接和输送等),新的监管方法仍需改进。两篇论文中的第一部分基于对三个欧洲案例的研究结果表明:TSO模型、发电机模型和第三方模型,都可以应用于中国。但是考虑到欧洲和中国的差异,建议中国采用和其首要目标最匹配的调控模式。[结论]如果中国的首要目标是改善发电和并网的协调发展,激励输电投资,则TSO模式是最好的选择。需要注意的是,采用具有法律约束力的并网计划、并网公司对于未能及时并网确立明晰的责任以及减少弃风弃光的发生,通过独立的监管机构来实施这一模式至关重要。

[Introduction] This paper is Part 2 of two papers,looking at applying European countries＇ experience with economic regulation to one of the urgent challenges of China＇s electricity systems： namely the effective connection of offshore wind. [Method]Using a methodology of comparative analysis of regulatory regimes,five components of regulatory regimes for offshore wind are defined and assessed for China： regulatory entity,degree of effective unbundling,tariff regulatory method and connection charging method and responsible entity. The paper analyses the changes to China＇ s network regulatory regime under w ay through Document No. 9 and related regulatory changes,including the introduction of a separate mechanism of economic regulation for China＇s network companies,vividly described as＂take control of the middle,release the two sides＂. [Result]The paper finds that the new regulatory methods still need refinement in order to ensure that they fulfil regulatory objectives such as allocative and cost efficiency,as well as quality of service-including timely connection and full transmission of onshore and offshore wind power. Based on the experience of three European case studies（ Part 1 of the two papers）,representing the TSO model,the generator model and the third-party model in Part 1,the paper concludes that in principle,all three models could be applied in China. Bearing in mind some similarities and differences in assumptions and priorities between Europe and China,the paper recommends that China adopts the regulatory model best aligned with its priorities. [Conclusion] If the most urgent priorities are to improve the co-ordinated development of generation and network capacities and to provide good incentives for transmission investments,the TSO model would be most suitable; however,it would be vital to implement this model through an independent regulator,with legally binding network planning and clear liabilities for the network companies＇ failure to connect in time,and also incentives to reduce curtailments.