基于博弈论视角下旅馆业不实名制行为的研究

Unreal-name System Behavior of Hotel Industry Based on Game Theory

从博弈论角度出发,构造公安机关和旅馆的博弈模型,通过对博弈双方的行为分析,发现旅馆不实名制行为的概率与公安机关的检查成本呈正比、与旅馆不实名制对公安机关的损失呈反比、与公安机关对旅馆不实名制的处罚呈反比,并从治安管理信息系统和旅馆管理制度及相关法律法规三方面提出建议,从而降低旅馆不实名制行为的概率。

From the perspective of game theory,we construct a game model between Public Security Unit and the hotels. By analyzing the behavior of both sides of the game,it is found that the probability of non-real name behavior of a hotel is proportional to the inspection cost of the public security organ,and an inversely proportional to the loss of the public security organ caused by the hotel non-real name system and the punishment of the public security organ. This paper puts forward some suggestions from three aspects： public security management information system,hotel management system and related laws and regulations in order to reduce the probability of hotel non-real name behavior.