摘要
在旅行社与导游的委托代理关系中,针对具有公平偏好的导游制定更加有效的激励机制,符合旅行社与导游的长远利益,更关系到旅游服务供应链的健康发展。建立由一个旅行社和两个导游组成的一对多委托代理模型,引入导游的横向公平偏好因素,在导游努力水平信息不对称的情况下,研究不同横向公平偏好信息结构下旅行社的最优激励机制和导游的最优努力水平。结果表明,在导游横向公平偏好信息为共同知识情况下,导游的最优努力水平随其横向公平偏好程度的增大而增大,旅行社只需雇佣横向公平偏好较强的导游就能够有效规避导游的"道德风险";另外,旅行社应该根据导游的横向公平偏好程度和风险规避度选择最优的决策情形并制定针对性的激励机制。特别地,针对横向公平偏好程度较强而风险规避度较低的导游,旅行社在决策时最好不要关注导游的横向公平偏好,导游能够通过自我激励达到比信息对称条件下更高的努力水平。
In the principal-agent relationship between travel agency and tour guide,design of more effective incentive mechanism with the tour guide's fairness preference conforms to the long-term interests of both,and related to the healthy development of the tourism service supply chain.This paper established a"oneto-many"principal-agent model composed of one travel agency and two tour guides,and the horizontal fairness preference of tour-guide is introduced.The optimal incentive mechanism and effort level are discussed under different information structure of horizontal fairness preference of tour-guide and the asymmetric information of effort level.The analysis shows that:The optimal effort level is the increasing function of horizontal fairness preference degree when the horizontal fairness preference information is common knowledge.The travel agency only needs to hire tour-guide with a higher degree of horizontal fairness preference to avoid the moral risks of tour-guide.In addition,the travel agency should go according to the horizontal fairness preference degree and risk aversion degree of tour-guide to select the optimal decisionmaking situation and formulate targeted incentive mechanism.Specially,the travel agency is best not to focus on the horizontal fairness preference when the tour-guide has a stronger fairness preference and a lower risk aversion preference,because the tour-guide can achieve a higher effort level than the condition of symmetric information through self-motivation.The results of the paper have a certain practical significance.
作者
林强
LIN Qiang(School of Biological and Chemical Engineering,Chongqing University of Education,Chongqing 400067,China)
出处
《旅游论坛》
2018年第4期105-115,共11页
Tourism Forum
基金
重庆市教委科学技术研究项目"基于公平偏好的旅游服务供应链激励与协调机制研究"(KJ1601409)
关键词
旅游业
公平偏好
委托-代理
激励机制
导游
tourism
fairness preference
principal-agent
incentive mechanism
tour-guide