PPP项目公司“投资者—运营商”双角色主体下双层委托代理模型研究

Study on Double Principle-agent Model of “Investors-Operators” Dual-Role Party’s in PPP Projects

针对角色重叠情景,即双角色主体情景,构建了包括政府、纯投资者和双角色主体的双层委托代理模型,定量分析了双角色主体努力水平和纯投资者与政府的激励机制,同时与角色不重叠的情景比较。研究发现：当运营商入股项目公司时,政府会随着运营商股权比例的提高而加大奖惩力度,间接影响纯投资者加大激励力度,可以有效降低运营商的投机风险;此时,运营商会付出更高的经济效益和社会效益的努力水平。但是考虑到各主体的不同诉求,股权比例并非越大越好。

This paper constructs double principle-agent model,including government,investor,dual-role party based on the ＂Investors-Operators＂ overlapping roles scenario,namely,dual-role party. And then,it analyzes the effort level of dual-role party,the incentive of government and investor and compares it with other scenario no overlap in investors and operators.Results show that,when operators also be investors in PPP projects,the government will increase rewards and punishment coefficient increases with dual-role party＇s equity ratio,and investors also improve their incentive coefficient under the influence of government,which can decrease the risk of opportunistic. And the dual-role party will improve the effort level of social benefit and economic benefit. However,considering about the difference demands of stakeholders,the equity ratio should not be too large.