摘要
考虑策略消费者的风险偏好行为,应用博弈理论探讨了集中化和分散化供应链模型下产品的两阶段定价问题。研究表明,随着策略消费者风险偏好程度的增加,制造商的批发价格不受影响,而零售商的第一阶段价格下降,第二阶段价格上升,且降价和提价的幅度相等,而供应链的总利润随策略消费者的风险偏好程度增加而下降。通过对比集中化和分散化供应链模型发现,无论消费者风险偏好程度如何变化,集中化决策的总利润始终高于分散化决策。
Considering the risk preference behavior of strategic consumers,the article discusses the two-stage pricing problem of product under centralized and decentralized supply chain model with game theory. Research shows that with the increase of risk appetite of strategic consumer,the wholesale price of the manufacturer is not affected,while the first stage price of the retailer drops and the second stage price rises,and the price reduction equals the price increase,and the total profit of the supply chain decreases. By comparing the centralized and decentralized supply chain model,we find that regardless of the change of consumers＇ risk preference,the gross profit under centralized decision is always higher than under the decentralized decision.
作者
罗新星
陈元元
LUO Xinxing;CHEN Yuanyuan(School of Business,Center South University,Changsha 410083,China)
出处
《经济与管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第5期73-83,共11页
Review of Economy and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目"面向环境管理的嵌入式服务决策支持理论与平台"(71431006/G0112)
