皮科克论知觉经验有非概念内容

Peacock's Theory of Perceptual Experience Has Non-conceptual Content

克里斯托弗·皮科克是心灵哲学和语言哲学中比较有影响的学者,他对非概念内容的发展作出了重要贡献,常常被视为非概念内容的代表。他从经验的细致性、经验与信念之间的关系、人类与动物知觉经验等方面论证知觉经验具有非概念内容。他的观点受到约翰·麦克道威尔的反驳,麦克道威尔认为知觉经验的内容是概念的,因为主体只有掌握相应的概念才能处于一个特定内容的知觉状态,经验与信念也要依赖概念能力的运用。那么,知觉经验的内容究竟是概念的还是非概念的?文章试图分析和论证皮科克关于知觉经验的非概念内容主张,并把他的非概念内容观点和麦克道威尔做比较,试图为皮科克的观点提供辩护,以期阐明知觉经验具有非概念内容的合理性。

Christopher Peacock is an influential scholar in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. He has made important contributions to the development of non-conceptual content and is often seen as a representation of non-conceptual content. He demonstrated the non-conceptual content of perceptual experience from the aspects of experience,the relationship between experience and belief（ or judgment）,and human and animal perceptual experience. His views were refuted by John Mc Dowell. Mc Dowell thought that the content of perceptual experience is conceptual,because the state of consciousness in a particular content requires the subject to grasp the corresponding concept,and both experience and belief are dependent on it. The content of experience can also be the content of judgment. Only adults who can use the conceptual ability can have perceptual experience. So,is the content of perceptual experience conceptual or non-conceptual？ The article attempts to analyze and demonstrate Peacock＇s non-concept content claims on perceptual experience,and compares his non-conceptual content views with Mc Dowell,trying to defend Peacock＇s view with a view to clarifying the rationality of perceptual experience with non-conceptual content.