财政分权与环境质量关系的再检验——基于政府偏好权变的视角

Reinspecion of the Relationship between Fiscal Decentralization and Environmental Quality:The Perspective of Government Preference

已有研究多静态分析中国式财政分权对生态环境的负面影响,强调地方政府因分权激励而推动地区经济增长,同时由于普遍存在投资性偏好,进而忽视地区环境质量的改善。通过考察地方政府偏好与中央政府考核、激励机制调整呈现的动态特征,基于地方政府偏好权变的视角对财政分权与环境质量关系进行了再检验。研究发现:财政分权对地方政府倾向具有很强的影响效应,财政分权程度较低时,地方政府倾向于投资性支出,而随着财政分权程度的提高,地方政府投资性偏好会减弱;地方政府偏好与地区环境质量存在显著相关关系,随着地方政府投资性偏好的减弱,地方政府改善环境的意愿会增强,相应投入也会增加,地区环境质量能够得到有效改善。

The existing research tends to statically analyze the adverse effect of Chinese fiscal decentral- ization on environmental quality, and emphasizes the influence of economic growth and promotion incen- tives on local government, which leads to widespread investment preference ignorance of regional environ- mental quality improvement. This paper expounds that local government preference will change with the ad- justment of the assessment and incentive mechanism of central government, and conducts a re - examination between fiscal decentralization and environment quality based on the view of government＇s preference varia- tion. Fiscal decentralization has a strong influence on local government preference. Local government pre- fers investment spending when the degree of fiscal decentralization is low, and this investment preference will weaken with the increase of fiscal decentralization. There is significant relationship between government preference and environmental quality. As the local government investment preference abates, the wishes of local government to improve environmental quality will increase, which can effectively improve the environ- mental quality in the region.