摘要
基于中国农业银行甘肃省分行与中小企业信贷关系,运用博弈理论分析在信息不对称情况下两者之间的信贷问题。结果表明,甘肃农行的决策行为会影响中小企业贷款的成功率,中小企业尽可能完全的信息披露会更容易得到甘肃农行的信贷资金。
Based on the credit relationship between Gansu Branch of Agricultural Bank of China and small and medium-sized enterprises(SME), we analyze the credit problems with game theory under condition of asymmetric information. The results indicate that the decision-making behavior of the Branch may affect the success rate of SME loans. The information disclosure of the SME may more likely get the Branch credit funds.
作者
柳江
霍治方
LIU Jiang;HUO Zhifang(Lanzhou University of Finance and Economics,Lanzhou 730020,China)
出处
《长春工业大学学报》
CAS
2018年第4期393-397,共5页
Journal of Changchun University of Technology
基金
2017年甘肃省社科规划重点项目(ZD007)
2017年兰州财经大学重大招标项目(Lzufe2017A-02)
关键词
信息不对称
重复博弈
期望效用
信贷配给
asymmetric information
repeated game
expected utility
credit rationing