供应链交叉持股对制造商直销渠道选择的影响

Influences of Cross-Shareholdings in Supply Chain on the Decision of Manufacturer's Direct Channel

针对供应链交叉持股这一情形,通过对比分析直销渠道开通前后制造商和零售商分配后利润大小,给出制造商开通直销渠道的前提条件,并探讨交叉持股份额对制造商开通直销渠道的意愿及各自最优决策的影响。研究表明:在制造商对零售商持股份额较大的情况下,制造商开通直销渠道的意愿较小,甚至于不愿意开通直销渠道,同时零售商也不希望制造商开通直销渠道;在零售商对制造商持股份额较大的情况下,虽然制造商开通直销渠道的意愿也很小,但零售商却比较希望制造商开通直销渠道。在单渠道和双渠道情境下,供应链中某一成员交叉持股份额的增加,都会促进对方净利润的增长,但通过利润的再分配,最终增加了自身分配后的利润,导致对方分配后利润下降。

In the case of the cross-shareholdings of a retailer and a supplier in supply chain,this paper suggests the criteria for the manufacturer on when to open direct channel by comparing the redistributed profits of the manufacturer and retailer before and after the dual-channel being opened.And the influences of the cross-shareholdings on the willingness of manufacturer to launch direct channel as well as their optimal decision-making under both single-channel and dual-channel scenarios are further explored.The results show that when the manufacturer holds a large share of the retailer,the manufacturer＇s willingness to open direct channel is small,or even reluctant to open direct channel.Meanwhile,the retailer does not want the manufacturer to open direct channel.When the retailer holds a large share of the manufacturer,the willingness of manufacturer to open direct channel is also small,but the retailer is more likely to want manufacturer to open direct channel.In both single-channel and dual-channel scenarios,the increase of proportion of cross-shareholdings of one member in a supply chain will lead to the increase of the net profit of another one in supply chain.Thus,through the redistribution of profits,its own final profit increases and leads to another one＇s decrease.