产品再制造、渠道竞争和制造商渠道入侵

Product remanufacturing,channel competition and manufacturer encroachment

针对制造商和零售商构成的二级供应链,通过建立无再制造与再制造两种情形下制造商的渠道入侵决策模型,分析了产品再制造、渠道竞争和制造商渠道入侵决策之间的内在关系.研究发现,1)产品再制造带来的成本节约效应缓解了渠道冲突,从而间接增加了制造商渠道入侵的动力.2)无再制造情形下制造商的渠道入侵会直接损害零售商的利益;而考虑产品再制造的闭环供应链中,再制造会对零售商产生正向的外部性效应使得当直销与传统渠道之间的竞争较小时,制造商的渠道入侵会提高零售商的收益.而如果渠道间的竞争较强时,再制造对零售商的外部性效应难以抵消渠道冲突对零售商利润降低的影响,从而渠道入侵会损害零售商.3)如果产品回收成本降低或再制造节约增加,则渠道入侵下再制造对于零售商的外部性效应会增强,且制造商和零售商受益于渠道入侵的Pareto共赢区间扩大.最后,对原始模型进行了不同维度的扩展,分析了零售商回收、产量竞争和多零售商竞争情形下以上研究结论的鲁棒性.

A two-level supply chain is studied which consists of a manufacturer and a retailer. Manufacturer channel encroachment models with remanufacturing and without remanufacturing respectively, are established to explore the interplay among product remanufacturing, channel competition and manufacturer encroachment behavior. The results are as follows. 1 ） Remanufacturing alleviates channel conflict by offering a lower aver- age product cost, which in turn motivates the manufacturer to encroach. 2） The manufacturer＇ s encroachment directly harms the retailer in the no-remanufacturing case. In contrast, remanufacturing has a positive exter- nality at the retailer level, which enhances the retailer＇ s payoff as long as the two channels do not compete in- tensely. However, this externality cannot fully counterbalance channel conflict when the two channels are more competitive, so the encroachment harms the retailer. 3 ） The externality of remanufacturing is stronger when the manufacturer reduces the collection costs or increases remanufacturing cost savings. Consequently, the Pa- reto gains in the supply chain enlarges. Finally, several extensions to our model verify that our model is still robust after considering the following cases： retailer collecting, quantity competition and multiple retailers.