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国家金融安全视角下的保险资金运用风险与治理--基于经理主义理论的分析 被引量:2

Risks and Governance of Insurance Funds from the Perspective of National Financial Security——Analysis based on the perspective of managerial theory
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摘要 进一步规范保险企业的公司行为与市场行为,关系到我国金融市场的稳定发展,对建设创新国家提供金融支持、构建现代化经济体系具有重要的现实意义。针对目前保险企业在公司治理、资金运用中的风险问题,分析这些现象的具体成因、表现及经济后果,发现经理主义理论可以很好地解释保险企业公司治理结构效率低下、资金运用风险高等问题。应该在明确保险资金运用风险成因的基础上,从完善"董监高"的个体治理、加强内外部治理力量、夯实监管机制及充分借鉴国外发达国家经验等层面,加强我国保险业治理,以促进我国金融市场及经济的稳定发展。 Further standardizing the behavior and market behavior of insurance companies is related to the stable development of China's financial market which has important practical significance for providing financial support for building an innovative country and building a modern economic system. The paper is based on the current realistic background of insurance companies in the corporate gov- ernance, capital utilization, based on managerial theory to analyze the specific causes, performance and economic consequences of these phenomena. The results show that the managerial theory can well explain the inefficiency of the corporate governance structure of insurance companies, the high risk of capital application. Finally, the article believes that: on the basis of clear causes, we should strengthen the governance of the insurance industry in China by improving the individual governance ofcompany executives, strengthe- ning internal and external governance, taming the regulatory mechanism, and fully learning from the experience of developed countries.
作者 黎仁华 薛建礼 LI Ren-huaa;XUE Jian-lib(a.School of Accountin;b.School of Insurance,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 6! 1130,China)
出处 《理论探讨》 CSSCI 北大核心 2018年第5期114-120,共7页 Theoretical Investigation
基金 四川省社会科学规划课题“国家审计对地方政府财政支出绩效的审计评价研究”(SCl6E086)阶段性成果
关键词 保险业 保险资金 经理主义 公司治理 经济后果 Insuranceindustry Insurance funds Managerialism Corporate governance Economic consequences
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