摘要
整全法是德沃金所提出的法律解释理论,要求法官对法律的解释能够最大程度契合并证立既有法律实践。论者以往多将其视为罗尔斯提出的"反思平衡"方法在司法裁判中的运用。这一解读有其合理之处,但也有明显不足:一方面,它忽略了德沃金在后期著作中将自己理论同罗尔斯立场加以区分的论述,因而误解了德沃金的核心理论;另一方面,它导致我们将寻求客观、普遍的裁判规则/原则视为法律解释的目标,但这一目标不仅在实践中不可得,而且在理论上不可欲,因为它忽视了法官在法律解释活动中无法避免的建构性作用。
Law as integrity is Dworkin's theory of legal interpretation,claiming judges should interpret legal doctrines in a way that both fits and justifies previous legal practice.Most commentators consider this theory as a judicial application of Rawls' methodology of moral philosophy in a theory of justice.This reading,to certain degree,is reasonable,but has fatal shortcomings.On one hand,it omits Dworkin in his later works distinguishes himself from Rawls' theory.On the other hand,it leads us to pursue an objective and universal judicial rule or principle as our goal of legal interpretation.But this goal is not only beyond our reach in practice,but also undesirable in theory,because it neglects the irreducible constructive role of judges in legal interpretation.
出处
《财经法学》
2018年第4期102-115,共14页
Law and Economy
关键词
整全法
反思平衡
整全性
道德判断
建构性
Law as integrity
Reflective equilibrium
Integrity
Moral judgments
Constructive