控股股东股权质押降低信息披露质量吗?

Does the Controlling Shareholder's Equity Pledge Reduce the Quality of Information Disclosure?

2014年股权质押迎来爆发式增长,虽缓解了股东融资约束,却也增强了股东市值管理的动机。那么,市值管理是否会加大控股股东信息选择性披露行为,降低信息披露质量?本文基于2008-2015年深交所上市公司的数据资料,研究了控股股东股权质押对企业信息披露质量的影响。研究发现,控股股东股权质押加剧了信息不对称程度,具体表现为控股股东股权质押增强了公司信息选择性披露动机,降低了信息披露质量。进一步研究表明,相比于国有企业,非国有企业控股股东存在股权质押时,其信息披露管理的机会主义更明显,信息披露质量更差;同时,良好的投资者法律保护环境能够有效抑制控股股东信息选择性披露动机,提高信息披露质量。这些结论在经过DID方法和PSM方法测试后依然稳健。

In 2014, the equity pledge ushered in explosive growth, which eased the financing constraints of shareholders, but also enhanced the motivation of the shareholders＇ market value management. Then, will the management of market value increase the selective disclosure of information by controlling shareholders and reduce the quality of information disclosure？ Based on the data of Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed company from 2008 to 2015, this paper studies the influence of equity pledge of controlling shareholders on the quality of corporate information disclosure. The study finds that the equity pledge of the controlling shareholder exacerbates the degree of information asymmetry. The concrete manifestation is that the equity pledge of the controlling shareholder enhances the selective disclosure of company information and reduces the quality of information disclosure. Further research shows that compared with state-owned enterprises, when the controlling shareholders of non-state-owned enterprises have equity pledges, the opportunism of their information disclosure management is more obvious and the quality of information disclosure is worse; at the same time, a good investor legal protection environment can effectively inhibit the controlling shareholders. Selective disclosure of information incentives to improve the quality of information disclosure. These conclusions are still robust after testing by Bertrand and Mullalain（2003） DID method and PSM method.