CEO过度自信、公司治理与盈余预测质量

CEO's Overconfidence, Corporate Governance and the Quality of Performance Forecasting

基于行为经济学的视角,以2012~2016年发布盈余预测公告的A股上市公司为样本,探讨了CEO过度自信、公司治理与盈余预测质量的相关关系。研究发现:CEO过度自信程度越大,上市公司盈余预测的偏离程度越大,相应的预测质量就越低;公司治理质量越高的上市公司,其盈余预测质量会越高,但由于两职合一、董事会规模、独立董事以及股权集中度等方面所存在的缺陷,公司治理在抑制CEO过度自信对于盈余预测质量负面影响方面并不显著;国有产权性质会对盈余预测的质量产生显著的负面影响,且强化了CEO过度自信对于盈余预测质量的负面影响。

Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2016 in China, this paper discussed the correlation between CEO＇s overconfidence, the quality of corporate governance and the quality of performance forecast.The study found that the higher the level of CEO overconfidence, the greater the deviation from the performance forecasting, corresponding the lower the quality of the performance forecasting. The higher the quality of corporate governance, the higher the quality of the performance forecasting. However, due to the limitation of the CEO duality,board size, independent directors and the concentration of equity, corporate governance can not effectively suppress the negative impact of CEO＇s overconfidence on the quality of performance forecasting. The nature of property right has a significant negative impact on the quality of performance forecasting and reinforces the negative impact of excessive CEO confidence on the quality of performance forecasting.