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比较哲学方法论新探

A New Inquiry of the Methodology of Comparative Philosophy
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摘要 跨文化哲学对话或是从事比较哲学研究毋需预设某种普遍有效的理想语言或者共享语言。针对理想语言假定与本质化的倾向,意义应当加以彻底的解本质化。哲学传统的三要素——传统、生活形式与概念图式——皆具有多元性,应当从多元、流变的角度来理解不同文化传统之间的“相似性与差异性”。不可能唯有一种借以辨识相似性与差异性的普遍的理想话语。对于相似性与差异性的辨识依赖于对相关生活形式的比较以及诠释中所运用的众多概念图式。诠释与比较可以用一种×YZ模式来表示。XY分别指涉来自不同哲学传统的文本,对X和Y进行比较可以比拟为由比较哲学家Z所建构起来的X和Y之间的虚拟交谈。比较哲学研究的一个重要的必要条件是相互谐适原则。 There is no need to presuppose a universally valid ideal language or shared language in any inquiry in intercultural or comparative philosophy. Against the hypothesis of ideal language and the tendency of essentialization, meaning should be completely de-essentialized. There is multiplicity to either of the three factors constituting a philosophical tradition, that is, tradition, form(s) of life, and conceptual scheme. "Similarities and differences" should be understood as always changing and plural. There cannot be a single universal ideal language for determining similarities and differences, which only make sense in relation to a comparison of relevant forms of life and to a plurality of conceptual schemes employed in interpretation. In the XYZ model for interpretation and comparison, X and Y refer to the texts from different philosophical traditions. A comparison of X and Y can be understood as a virtual dialogue between X and Y that is established by the comparative philosopher Z. An important necessary condition for comparative philosophy is the principle of mutual attunement.
作者 马琳 凡·柏拉克 MA Lin;Jaap van Brakel
出处 《学术月刊》 CSSCI 北大核心 2018年第9期35-43,共9页 Academic Monthly
基金 “中国人民大学2018年度中央高校建设世界一流大学(哲学)和特色发展引导专项资金”支持
关键词 理想语言 概念图式 生活形式 比较哲学 相互谐适原则 ideal language conceptual scheme form(s) of life comparative philosophy principle of mutual attunement
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