认知概率与实践理性

Epistemic Probability and Practical Rationality

任何知识归因理论都必须涉及两个方面的问题:知识是否是可错的;以及知识的归因是否应该包含实践理性因素。语境主义选择了可错论和理智主义,但是它既无法解决由可错论所引起的阈值问题和反直觉宣称,又无法对语境的转换机制做出确切地说明。理由-知识原则虽然提出了更加符合我们直觉的反理智主义,但是却选择了不可错论与之相结合。我们关于日常知识的打赌表明,我们的知识并不满足认知概率等于1。并且,将知识视作唯一能够作为行动理由的认知状态,这点也不符合我们对日常行为的评价现象。只有知识-辩护原则和用实践因素定义的可错论相结合,才能够在尊重我们的直觉的同时,最好地解决上述两个问题。

There are two important problems concerning knowledge ascription： Whether knowing p is compatible with the probability of not-p; whether pragmatic encroachment on knowledge ascription is right. Contextualism stands for both fallibilism and intellectualism. However, it can never set a threshold of epistemic probability for knowledge or explain away the counter-intuitive assertions of fallibilism. Moreover, it has failed to give an explicit answer to the mechanism of context-shift. As to the Reason-Knowledge Principle, though it has represented a more reliable theory of anti-intellectualism, it is still within the frame of infallibilism. Its proposal that knowledge has an epistemic probability I is incompatible with the intuition behind our rejection of knowledge bet. More importantly, the Reason4-Knowledge Principle has argued that only knowledge can be the reason for action, which is also unconvincing given our ordinary appraisal of action. The most promising way to solve these problems is to combine Knowledge-Justification Principle and pragmatic fallibilism, both of which fully respect our intuition.