商品众筹定价策略研究

Study on Pricing Strategy for Commodity Crowd-funding

商品众筹和"团购+预售"销售模式类似,但由于其产品通常具有独特的创意,众筹投资者与普通消费者相比偏好较强,因而具有多种定价策略。通过简单的一般需求函数,从发起人利润最大化视角进行分析,可以发现,在不提供数量折扣的前提下,是否实行价格歧视对产品的销量并无影响,而且对众筹投资者进行价格歧视并面向普通消费者进行销售可以增加生产者的利润;在提供数量折扣的条件下,投资者由于信息对称进行联合购买会降低生产者的利润水平,并且产品的销量也会减少。

Commodity crowd-funding is similar to ＂group purchase plus pre-sale＂ in terms of sales mode, but because its products usually contain unique ideas, crowd-funding investors have a strong preference on the products compared with ordinary consumers, thus the sellers may have a variety of pricing strategies. Analyzed from the perspective of profit maximization of sponsors via a simple general demand function, it can be found that price discrimination has no impact on the sales volume of products provided that there are no quantity discounts offered. Moreover, carrying out price discrimination on the investors in the crowd-funding stage and then selling products to ordinary consumers can increase the producer＇s profit; when offering quantity discounts, the joint purchase behavior of crow-funding investors due to information symmetry will lower the producer＇s profit as well as the product＇s sales.